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DDI # 1170-77

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Index Legend
77-6660/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : DDI Views on Establishment of Liaison
with Cabinet Officers

Background

1. Until recently the DDI conducted its departmental liaison on a decentralized basis, permitting each office to handle its own customer relations. The resulting arrangements worked well for some disciplines, i.e., economic and military intelligence, but less so for diffuse categories such as political and scientific intelligence.

2. Continuing intelligence support--approaching day-to-day liaison--is presently provided to State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and the NSC Staff. At the present time, we have resident liaison and briefing officers only at Treasury and Commerce. By far, the majority of the consumer-producer interactions with Cabinet departments take place at the working level where our substantive analysts participate in interdepartmental and interagency working groups as well as maintaining day-to-day contact on subjects of mutual interest. Office directors and senior analysts also are in contact with department officials--usually at the Assistant Secretary level and below--but generally at less frequent intervals. High level intelligence briefings for Secretaries and their staffs are provided both at our initiatives and upon request. This arrangement has provided somewhat uneven coverage in the past and we decided to make some changes last fall.

Discussion

3. The facts are that hardly a working day passes that CIA Directorate of Intelligence analysts and supervisors are not in liaison on substantive intelligence

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matters in several departments. Our intelligence officers and their policy community counterparts gravitate toward each other in reaction to events and at each others' levels of responsibility.

4. Our present liaison with the departments is along these lines:

a. Defense and State: The CIA has had a long and generally satisfactory relationship with Defense and State; liaison officers have been assigned to both from time to time in the past. Day-to-day liaison with Defense and State at a single point of contact does not seem warranted under the present circumstances.

b. Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture: We have maintained day-to-day liaison with the first two departments for several years. And, because of the growing world interdependence of food production and the domestic ramifications of foreign agricultural policies and actions we intend to maintain closer liaison with Agriculture than in the past.

c. Energy: The new Energy department will require foreign intelligence support. We will cover problems ranging from the nuclear proliferation problem to support for international energy negotiations with OPEC and others. We have already initiated support to Dr. Schlesinger and intend to expand that support to his principal deputies as the department is organized.

d. Justice falls into a separate category due to the operational nature of the FBI and DDO relationship. We do provide substantive intelligence support to them--usually on terrorism and narcotics--through the CIA officer for narcotics and through the DDI member of the Cabinet Committee Intelligence Working Group.

e. Transportation, Interior, HEW, and Labor: These four departments are increasingly being confronted with both international problems and domestic problems of foreign origin. Day-to-day liaison is probably not warranted at this time but we are producing intelligence relevant to their concerns and more regular contact probably would be beneficial to them.

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25X1

f. Housing and Urban Development: At the present time we are producing little intelligence directly affecting HUD but we are beginning to work on areas of foreign technology and urban environmental developments which may be of some interest.

Conclusions

5. We intend to expand liaison relations between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Cabinet departments on substantive matters by utilizing the newly established Center for Policy Support to supplement the existing liaison between the production offices and the departments. The principal function of the CPS will be to monitor the intelligence support provided by the production offices, to augment it where it is not naturally occurring, and to insure that no lapses occur. For departments with lesser intelligence needs--such as HUD, HEW, and Interior--we will initiate liaison using officers with the appropriate expertise. I expect in some cases to become directly involved in the effort to expand our intelligence support and may ask for your assistance at the Cabinet level from time to time.

6. We believe that liaison arrangements should be approved by the Cabinet Secretaries and that the agreement be made known--on a need-to-know basis--to their staffs and those who would be working with the Intelligence Community. It would be appropriate that the Center for Policy Support maintain contact with someone in the Secretaries' Offices so that some centralization of the relationship exists both here and there.

7. We believe that the NIO's mission for developing Community assessments should be clearly differentiated from the day-to-day liaison between the individual Departments and the CIA.

8. We recommend that you remind Cabinet officers of the DCI publication, A Consumers Guide to the Intelligence

- 3 -

SECRET

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Community and its Products, pointing out this Guide should help them in getting their legitimate intelligence needs satisfied.*

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Sayre Stevens
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment:
As stated

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23 March 1977

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Distribution:

Original - DCI
1 - DCI
① - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DDI
2 - CPS

**Excerpts from this Guide are attached*

- 4 -

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A Consumer's Guide to the Intelligence Community and Its Products


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INTRODUCTION

The Intelligence Community, led by the Director of Central Intelligence, exists primarily to support the senior policy-makers of the United States Government with information and analyses of foreign events, developments, and trends. This guide aims to help these policy-makers obtain what they need from the Intelligence Community.

The Community works with and supplies both unclassified and classified information on foreign developments; its analysts seek the meaning of data contained in published statistics and public speech, as well as the secret data in foreign war plans and sensitive political directives. Correspondingly, the Community offers to the senior policy-maker a broad range of information and interpretation through a variety of media—reports of individual events, periodical “newspapers” and journals, daily summaries of information, biographic sketches and psychological studies, technical weapons analyses, formal estimates of longer-term trends and objectives of foreign governments.

We believe that senior policy-makers, our major consumers, will be better able to make use of this store of intelligence if they have more precise knowledge of what the Community produces and a clearer idea as to where in the Community specific kinds of services are most likely to be found. And where to start looking. We also believe that our consumers will have a better “feel” for the intelligence available to them if they have some understanding of the process by which information and analyses from the Community reach their desks. This guide therefore begins with a brief description of that process.

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A. Setting Priorities and Tasking

The *Director of Central Intelligence* is the top manager of the Intelligence Community. His statutory deputy (DDCI) is the day-to-day manager of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director has two other deputies to assist him with his Community responsibilities: a Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC),* and a Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence (D/DCI/NI). These two deputies and their staffs work together and with consumers to frame *Key Intelligence Questions*, to develop strategies for collecting the information that will answer those key questions, to coordinate the collection activities of the intelligence agencies, and ultimately, to reach judgments as to whether the task has been fulfilled and the questions answered.

The *Committee on Foreign Intelligence* is the interagency mechanism to control budget preparation and resource allocation, as well as to establish policy priorities for collection and production, to establish policy for management of the National Foreign Intelligence program, and to provide continuing guidance to ensure compliance with policy directions of the National Security Council. The Director of Central Intelligence chairs the Committee, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as members.

The *Intelligence Community Staff* provides staff support for the Committee and this staff also focuses its attention on making sure that the interagency processes are working and that resources are being properly allocated. It develops general answers to the question: how well is the Community doing?

The *National Intelligence Officers*, senior people drawn from all elements of the Community and from outside the government, concentrate on the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the world—the USSR, China, Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the Far East other than China—and of particular functional areas—strategic military forces, conventional

* Legislation is currently before Congress to make the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community a statutory second deputy with the title Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Community).

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forces, economic intelligence. The NIOs are the vehicles for obtaining Community assessments. These officers also are, on the one hand, the "consumers' people," working closely with policy-makers carrying regional or functional responsibilities, and, on the other, advisers to the DCI who offer suggestions on substantive intelligence targets to other Community components. A list of these NIOs and their telephone numbers is in Annex 2.

The *National Foreign Intelligence Board*, composed of the heads of the major components of the Community—CIA, State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency—and of representatives from the FBI, Treasury, and the Energy Research and Development Administration (nuclear matters), with the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence units attending as observers, acts as kind of board of review under the chairmanship of the DCI, advising him on tasking problems and collection capabilities, approving National Estimates, and generally making him aware directly of developments in the Community. A list of the members of NFIB is in Annex 1.

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C. Central Intelligence Agency

CIA produces an extremely wide variety of both finished and "raw" (unanalyzed) intelligence. Virtually all of CIA's finished intelligence is designed to support either the national leadership or planning and decision-making by other agencies.

1. The *Directorate of Intelligence*, headed by a Deputy Director for Intelligence, produces the bulk of the finished intelligence work done in CIA and is the executive agent for meeting the CIA's responsibility to produce national current intelligence. This directorate is organized in eleven specialized production units:

a. The *Center for Policy Support* is a new office which, among other functions, produces interdisciplinary intelligence analyses to support negotiations, such as SALT and MBFR, and undertakes projects that clearly demand a multi-office approach. It also coordinates substantive intelligence materials produced in support of the Congress, working closely with the Office of the Legislative Counsel in CIA. It assigns responsibility within the Directorate for special support to high-level interagency activities.

b. The *Office of Regional and Political Analyses* is a newly formed office, aiming to produce current and mid-term analysis of significant political developments, worldwide, as well as political research in greater depth on selected topics and using various methodological approaches. The office is organized by geographic regions, with a functional unit devoted to its research responsibility. Its work appears in current intelligence publications, and it produces its own series of *Staff Notes*. One of this series is devoted to intelligence on foreign narcotics traffic.

c. The *Office of Strategic Research* produces military and military-economic intelligence on foreign military forces world-wide, but with principal emphasis on the USSR, China, and other Communist Countries and the Middle East. It provides major support to the NIOs in the production of Estimates on Warsaw Pact forces and Soviet intercontinental forces. It also produces both its own intelligence reports and items for the national current intelligence publications.

d. The *Office of Economic Research* produces economic analyses of the national policies, internal structure, recent developments, future prospects, external policies, and strengths and weaknesses of all foreign

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countries of significance to US policy. OER publishes two major periodicals, the *Economic Intelligence Weekly* and *International Oil Developments*, as well as numerous studies and memoranda, and participates in all national production having an economic dimension.

e. The *Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research* produces basic and geographic intelligence, world-wide, and provides map reference and specialized cartographic services. It has a particular interest in the influence of climate, weather, and soils on foreign agricultural production; in the basic information to support Law of the Sea negotiations; and in intelligence relating to foreign energy resources.

f. The *Office of Central Reference* produces biographic intelligence on all leading nonmilitary foreign personalities. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] OCR maintains the CIA Library and general reference facilities.

g. The *Office of Imagery Analysis* furnishes photo interpretation support to CIA analytic components and produces for national users reporting on economic and industrial facilities on the basis of photo reconnaissance.

h. The *Office of Scientific Intelligence* produces intelligence on foreign scientific and engineering research and advanced technology in the physical and life sciences. Current items are published in a *Weekly Surveyor*; a monthly compilation of analytical articles appears in the *Scientific Intelligence Digest*; in-depth studies are published as *Scientific and Technical Intelligence Reports*.

i. The *Office of Weapons Intelligence* produces intelligence on the technical capabilities of foreign offensive and defensive weapons systems and space systems. It publishes a daily *Weapons Intelligence Summary*; other analyses appear in the publications of the Office of Scientific Intelligence.

j. The *Current Reporting Group* is the office directly responsible for the content of the national current intelligence publication, the *National Intelligence Daily*, and for CIA's current intelligence weekly publications, the *Weekly Review* and the *Weekly Summary*. A special staff within the CRG is dedicated to supplying finished current intelligence material to the President and to the White House Situation Room.

24

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k. The *Publications and Presentations Group* is responsible for the physical preparation of the Directorate's publications for printing, and for the development of other presentational means.

2. The *Directorate of Operations* produces individual unfinished intelligence reports that are "raw" in the sense that they consist of information, obtained clandestinely, that has not been finally evaluated or analyzed. These reports have been screened and processed, however, both in the field and in CIA headquarters, to determine whether the significance and degree of reliability of their information warrants dissemination. This Directorate also prepares a *Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism* on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on that subject. The Counterintelligence Staff produces case studies, notes and summaries on counterintelligence, and a series analyzing foreign intelligence/security agencies for distribution to the Community.

3. The *Directorate of Science and Technology* administers the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. FBIS, while not a producer of finished intelligence in the sense that the offices of the Directorate of Intelligence are, produces *Daily Reports* of radio broadcasts which receive wide dissemination in and beyond the Intelligence Community (and beyond the government to institutional subscribers among universities and foundations). FBIS also produces special collections, e.g., foreign broadcast reactions to major developments in US policy and national elections.

The *National Photographic Interpretation Center* is also managed within this Directorate. NPIC is a CIA/Defense center, and its product is disseminated to its parent agencies, which in turn produce finished intelligence based on the materials that NPIC collects and processes. NPIC also makes available, however, photographic interpretation reports and briefing boards for national-level consumers.

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Executive Registry
77-6666

11 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

Please give me your views on how we can establish day-by-day liaison with each of the Cabinet Officers departments in order to insure that we are fulfilling their intelligence needs.



STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

77-6660/3

1170-77/2

The attached answers your query on the Cabinet Committee Intelligence Working Group referred to in our memorandum, "DDI Views on Establishment of Liaison with Cabinet officers."

Paul V. Walsh
A/DDI

Date

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
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ODDI/kss/[](31 Mar 77)

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DDI

31 March 1977

MEMORANDUM

1. The reference to the Cabinet Committee Intelligence Working Group referred to one of the bureaucratic elements of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC). CCINC activities were supported by a Working Group with several subcommittees, one of which was on Intelligence and chaired by CIA. The CCINC, which included the DCI as a member, was established in 1971 by President Nixon.

2. President Carter has disbanded the CCINC along with other Cabinet Committees, and in the case of narcotics, has formed the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP). Within ODAP, inter-agency project teams are being formed in several areas, one of which is Intelligence. CIA is to be represented in that group.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DDI # 1170-77/1

Executive Registry

57-6166/3

Admiral Turner asked

What is the "Cabinet Committee
Intelligence Working Group"

(page 2, DDI memo)

[Signature]

29/3/77

DDI:

Your action, pls.


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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Admiral Turner asked
What is the "Cabinet Committee
Challenging Working Group"
(page 2, DDI memo)

[Signature]

29/3/77

DDI:

Your action, please.

SA/DC

29 March 77

DDT)